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The 17^th Century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes is nowwidely regarded as one of a handful of truly great politicalphilosophers, whose masterwork Leviathan rivals insignificance the political writings of Plato, Aristotle, Locke,Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. Hobbes is famous for his early andelaborate development of what has come to be known as 'socialcontract theory', the method of justifying political principlesor arrangements by appeal to the agreement that would be made amongsuitably situated rational, free, and equal persons. He is infamousfor having used the social contract method to arrive at theastonishing conclusion that we ought to submit to the authority of anabsolute—undivided and unlimited—sovereign power. Whilehis methodological innovation had a profound constructive impact onsubsequent work in political philosophy, his substantive conclusionshave served mostly as a foil for the development of more palatablephilosophical positions. Hobbes's moral philosophy has been lessinfluential than his political philosophy, in part because that theoryis too ambiguous to have garnered any general consensus as to itscontent. Most scholars have taken Hobbes to have affirmed some sort ofpersonal relativism or subjectivism; but views that Hobbes espouseddivine command theory, virtue ethics, rule egoism, or a form ofprojectivism also find support in Hobbes's texts and amongscholars. Because Hobbes held that 'the true doctrine of theLawes of Nature is the true Morall philosophie', differences ininterpretation of Hobbes's moral philosophy can be traced to differingunderstandings of the status and operation of Hobbes's 'laws ofnature', which laws will be discussed below. The formerlydominant view that Hobbes espoused psychological egoism as thefoundation of his moral theory is currently widely rejected, and therehas been to date no fully systematic study of Hobbes's moralpsychology.

Time Stopper Download To download Time Stopper 4.02 click on the below Time stopper download link: 7. How to install Time Stopper? The Time Stopper installation took only a few minutes. The installation process is very easy and similar to other software. So try it yourself to install Time Stopper, if you have any problem then comment in below. Start the program. The first time that you use it the program it will present you with a license screen. The program is free and the license info is only displayed the first time (per PC). OnlyStopWatch does not have to be installed and can be executed easily from the desktop, and can be carried on a small usb-stick or other memory device. Article Summary X. To stop cracking your neck, start by gently stretching your neck muscles 3-5 times a day, since stretching can reduce some of the tension and discomfort that makes you want to crack your neck. Additionally, move your neck up and down, side to side, and in circles to loosen your joints. COX Stockman's are Engineered for life and built to last the test of time. Stockman's stand up to Australia's harsh conditions and are designed to handle tough jobs. Initial velocity multiplied by the time required to stop. In this case, this works out to be.5. 88. 4.4 = 193.6 feet, plus a reaction time of either 88 feet for a second delay in reaction time, or 176 feet for two seconds reaction time. That yields 281.6 feet or 369.6 when added to the base stopping distance of 193.6 feet.

• Bibliography

1. Major Political Writings

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Hobbes wrote several versions of his political philosophy, includingThe Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (also under thetitles Human Nature and De Corpore Politico)published in 1650, De Cive (1642) published in English asPhilosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society in1651, the English Leviathan published in 1651, and its Latinrevision in 1668. Others of his works are also important inunderstanding his political philosophy, especially his history of theEnglish Civil War, Behemoth (published 1679), DeCorpore (1655), De Homine (1658), Dialogue Between aPhilosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (1681),and The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance(1656). All of Hobbes's major writings are collected in TheEnglish Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Sir William Molesworth(11 volumes, London 1839–45), and Thomae Hobbes Opera PhilosophicaQuae Latina Scripsit Omnia, also edited by Molesworth (5 volumes;London, 1839–45). Oxford University Press has undertaken a projected26 volume collection of the Clarendon Edition of the Works ofThomas Hobbes. So far 3 volumes are available: De Cive(edited by Howard Warrender), The Correspondence of ThomasHobbes (edited by Noel Malcolm), and Writings on Common Lawand Hereditary Right (edited by Alan Cromartie and QuentinSkinner). Recently Noel Malcolm has published a three volume editionof Leviathan, which places the English text side by side withHobbes's later Latin version of it. Readers new to Hobbes should beginwith Leviathan, being sure to read Parts Three and Four, as well asthe more familiar and often excerpted Parts One and Two. There are manyfine overviews of Hobbes's normative philosophy, some of which arelisted in the following selected bibliography of secondary works.

2. The Philosophical Project

Hobbes sought to discover rational principles for the construction ofa civil polity that would not be subject to destruction from within.Having lived through the period of political disintegrationculminating in the English Civil War, he came to the view that theburdens of even the most oppressive government are 'scarcesensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, thataccompany a Civill Warre'. Because virtually any governmentwould be better than a civil war, and, according to Hobbes's analysis,all but absolute governments are systematically prone to dissolutioninto civil war, people ought to submit themselves to an absolutepolitical authority. Continued stability will require that they alsorefrain from the sorts of actions that might undermine such aregime. For example, subjects should not dispute the sovereign powerand under no circumstances should they rebel. In general, Hobbes aimedto demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between political obedienceand peace.

3. The State of Nature

To establish these conclusions, Hobbes invites us to consider whatlife would be like in a state of nature, that is, a condition withoutgovernment. Perhaps we would imagine that people might fare best insuch a state, where each decides for herself how to act, and is judge,jury and executioner in her own case whenever disputes arise—andthat at any rate, this state is the appropriate baseline against whichto judge the justifiability of political arrangements. Hobbes termsthis situation 'the condition of mere nature', a state ofperfectly private judgment, in which there is no agency withrecognized authority to arbitrate disputes and effective power toenforce its decisions.

Hobbes's near descendant, John Locke, insisted in his SecondTreatise of Government that the state of nature was indeed to bepreferred to subjection to the arbitrary power of an absolutesovereign. But Hobbes famously argued that such a 'dissolutecondition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and acoercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge' wouldmake impossible all of the basic security upon which comfortable,sociable, civilized life depends. There would be 'no place forindustry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently noculture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities thatmay be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments ofmoving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge ofthe face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; andwhich is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death;And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.'If this is the state of nature, people have strong reasons to avoid it,which can be done only by submitting to some mutually recognized publicauthority, for 'so long a man is in the condition of mere nature,(which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure ofgood and evill.'

Although many readers have criticized Hobbes's state of nature asunduly pessimistic, he constructs it from a number of individuallyplausible empirical and normative assumptions. He assumes that peopleare sufficiently similar in their mental and physical attributes thatno one is invulnerable nor can expect to be able to dominate theothers. Hobbes assumes that people generally 'shun death',and that the desire to preserve their own lives is very strong in mostpeople. While people have local affections, their benevolence islimited, and they have a tendency to partiality. Concerned that othersshould agree with their own high opinions of themselves, people aresensitive to slights. They make evaluative judgments, but often useseemingly impersonal terms like ‘good' and‘bad' to stand for their own personal preferences. They arecurious about the causes of events, and anxious about their futures;according to Hobbes, these characteristics incline people to adoptreligious beliefs, although the content of those beliefs will differdepending upon the sort of religious education one has happened toreceive.

With respect to normative assumptions, Hobbes ascribes to eachperson in the state of nature a liberty right to preserve herself,which he terms 'the right of nature'. This is the right todo whatever one sincerely judges needful for one's preservation; yetbecause it is at least possible that virtually anything might be judgednecessary for one's preservation, this theoretically limited right ofnature becomes in practice an unlimited right to potentially anything,or, as Hobbes puts it, a right 'to all things'. Hobbesfurther assumes as a principle of practical rationality, that peopleshould adopt what they see to be the necessary means to their mostimportant ends.

4. The State of Nature Is a State of War

Taken together, these plausible descriptive and normativeassumptions yield a state of nature potentially fraught with divisivestruggle. The right of each to all things invites serious conflict,especially if there is competition for resources, as there will surelybe over at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands,spouses, etc. People will quite naturally fear that others may (citingthe right of nature) invade them, and may rationally plan to strikefirst as an anticipatory defense. Moreover, that minority of pridefulor 'vain-glorious' persons who take pleasure in exercisingpower over others will naturally elicit preemptive defensive responsesfrom others. Conflict will be further fueled by disagreement inreligious views, in moral judgments, and over matters as mundane aswhat goods one actually needs, and what respect one properly merits.Hobbes imagines a state of nature in which each person is free todecide for herself what she needs, what she's owed, what's respectful,right, pious, prudent, and also free to decide all of these questionsfor the behavior of everyone else as well, and to act on her judgmentsas she thinks best, enforcing her views where she can. In this situationwhere there is no common authority to resolve these many and seriousdisputes, we can easily imagine with Hobbes that the state of naturewould become a 'state of war', even worse, a war of'all against all'.

5. Further Questions About the State of Nature

In response to the natural question whether humanity ever wasgenerally in any such state of nature, Hobbes gives three examples ofputative states of nature. First, he notes that all sovereigns are inthis state with respect to one another. This claim has made Hobbes therepresentative example of a 'realist' in internationalrelations. Second, he opined that many now civilized peoples wereformerly in that state, and some few peoples—'the savagepeople in many places of America' (Leviathan, XIII),for instance—were still to his day in the state of nature. Thirdand most significantly, Hobbes asserts that the state of nature willbe easily recognized by those whose formerly peaceful states havecollapsed into civil war. While the state of nature's condition ofperfectly private judgment is an abstraction, something resembling ittoo closely for comfort remains a perpetually present possibility, tobe feared, and avoided.

Do the other assumptions of Hobbes's philosophy license the existenceof this imagined state of isolated individuals pursuing their privatejudgments? Probably not, since, as feminist critics among others havenoted, children are by Hobbes's theory assumed to have undertaken anobligation of obedience to their parents in exchange for nurturing,and so the primitive units in the state of nature will includefamilies ordered by internal obligations, as well as individuals. Thebonds of affection, sexual affinity, and friendship—as well asof clan membership and shared religious belief—may furtherdecrease the accuracy of any purely individualistic model of the stateof nature. This concession need not impugn Hobbes's analysis ofconflict in the state of nature, since it may turn out thatcompetition, diffidence and glory-seeking are disastrous sources ofconflicts among small groups just as much as they are amongindividuals. Still, commentators seeking to answer the question howprecisely we should understand Hobbes's state of nature areinvestigating the degree to which Hobbes imagines that to be acondition of interaction among isolated individuals.

Another important open question is that of what, exactly, it is abouthuman beings that makes it the case (supposing Hobbes is right) thatour communal life is prone to disaster when we are left to interactaccording only to our own individual judgments. Perhaps, while peopledo wish to act for their own best long-term interest, they areshortsighted, and so indulge their current interests without properlyconsidering the effects of their current behavior on their long-terminterest. This would be a type of failure ofrationality. Alternatively, it may be that people in the state ofnature are fully rational, but are trapped in a situation that makesit individually rational for each to act in a way that is sub-optimalfor all, perhaps finding themselves in the familiar ‘prisoner'sdilemma' of game theory. Or again, it may be that Hobbes's stateof nature would be peaceful but for the presence of persons (just afew, or perhaps all, to some degree) whose passions overrule theircalmer judgments; who are prideful, spiteful, partial, envious,jealous, and in other ways prone to behave in ways that lead towar. Such an account would understand irrational human passions to bethe source of conflict. Which, if any, of these accounts adequatelyanswers to Hobbes's text is a matter of continuing debate among Hobbesscholars. Game theorists have been particularly active in thesedebates, experimenting with different models for the state of natureand the conflict it engenders.

6. The Laws of Nature

Hobbes argues that the state of nature is a miserable state of warin which none of our important human ends are reliably realizable.Happily, human nature also provides resources to escape this miserablecondition. Hobbes argues that each of us, as a rational being, can seethat a war of all against all is inimical to the satisfaction of herinterests, and so can agree that 'peace is good, and thereforealso the way or means of peace are good'. Humans will recognizeas imperatives the injunction to seek peace, and to do those thingsnecessary to secure it, when they can do so safely. Hobbes calls thesepractical imperatives 'Lawes of Nature', the sum of whichis not to treat others in ways we would not have them treat us. These'precepts', 'conclusions' or'theorems' of reason are 'eternal andimmutable', always commanding our assent even when they may notsafely be acted upon. They forbid many familiar vices such as iniquity,cruelty, and ingratitude. Although commentators do not agree on whetherthese laws should be regarded as mere precepts of prudence, or ratheras divine commands, or moral imperatives of some other sort, all agreethat Hobbes understands them to direct people to submit to politicalauthority. They tell us to seek peace with willing others by layingdown part of our 'right to all things', by mutuallycovenanting to submit to the authority of a sovereign, and furtherdirect us to keep that covenant establishing sovereignty.

7. Establishing Sovereign Authority

When people mutually covenant each to the others to obey a commonauthority, they have established what Hobbes calls 'sovereigntyby institution'. When, threatened by a conqueror, they covenantfor protection by promising obedience, they have established'sovereignty by acquisition'. These are equally legitimateways of establishing sovereignty, according to Hobbes, and theirunderlying motivation is the same—namely fear—whether ofone's fellows or of a conqueror. The social covenant involves both therenunciation or transfer of right and the authorization of thesovereign power. Political legitimacy depends not on how a governmentcame to power, but only on whether it can effectively protect thosewho have consented to obey it; political obligation ends whenprotection ceases.

8. Absolutism

Although Hobbes offered some mild pragmatic grounds for preferringmonarchy to other forms of government, his main concern was to arguethat effective government—whatever its form—must have absoluteauthority. Its powers must be neither divided nor limited. The powersof legislation, adjudication, enforcement, taxation, war-making (andthe less familiar right of control of normative doctrine) are connectedin such a way that a loss of one may thwart effective exercise of therest; for example, legislation without interpretation and enforcementwill not serve to regulate conduct. Only a government that possessesall of what Hobbes terms the 'essential rights ofsovereignty' can be reliably effective, since where partial setsof these rights are held by different bodies that disagree in theirjudgments as to what is to be done, paralysis of effective government,or degeneration into a civil war to settle their dispute, mayoccur.

Similarly, to impose limitation on the authority of the governmentis to invite irresoluble disputes over whether it has overstepped thoselimits. If each person is to decide for herself whether the governmentshould be obeyed, factional disagreement—and war to settle theissue, or at least paralysis of effective government—are quitepossible. To refer resolution of the question to some furtherauthority, itself also limited and so open to challenge foroverstepping its bounds, would be to initiate an infinite regress ofnon-authoritative ‘authorities' (where the buck neverstops). To refer it to a further authority itself unlimited, would bejust to relocate the seat of absolute sovereignty, a position entirelyconsistent with Hobbes's insistence on absolutism. To avoid thehorrible prospect of governmental collapse and return to the state ofnature, people should treat their sovereign as having absoluteauthority.

9. Responsibility and the Limits of Political Obligation

When subjects institute a sovereign by authorizing it, they agree, inconformity with the principle 'no wrong is done to a consentingparty', not to hold it liable for any errors in judgment it maymake and not to treat any harms it does to them as actionableinjustices. Although many interpreters have assumed that byauthorizing a sovereign, subjects become morally responsible for theactions it commands, Hobbes instead insists that 'the externalactions done in obedience to [laws], without the inward approbation,are the actions of the sovereign, and not of the subject, which is inthat case but as an instrument, without any motion of his own atall' (Leviathan xlii, 106). It may be important to Hobbes'sproject of persuading his Christian readers to obey their sovereignthat he can reassure them that God will not hold them responsible forwrongful actions done at the sovereign's command, because they cannotreasonably be expected to obey if doing so would jeopardize theireternal prospects. Hence Hobbes explains that 'whatsoever asubject..is compelled to do in obedience to his sovereign, and dothit not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of hiscountry, that action is not his, but his sovereign's.'(Leviathan xlii. 11) This position reinforces absolutism by permittingHobbes to maintain that subjects can obey even commands to performactions they believe to be sinful without fear of divinepunishment.

While Hobbes insists that we should regard our governments as havingabsolute authority, he reserves to subjects the liberty of disobeyingsome of their government's commands. He argues that subjects retain aright of self-defense against the sovereign power, giving them theright to disobey or resist when their lives are in danger. He alsogives them seemingly broad resistance rights in cases in which theirfamilies or even their honor are at stake. These exceptions haveunderstandably intrigued those who study Hobbes. His ascription ofapparently inalienable rights—what he calls the 'trueliberties of subjects'—seems incompatible with his defenseof absolute sovereignty. Moreover, if the sovereign's failure toprovide adequate protection to subjects extinguishes their obligationto obey, and if it is left to each subject to judge for herself theadequacy of that protection, it seems that people have never reallyexited the fearsome state of nature. This aspect of Hobbes's politicalphilosophy has been hotly debated ever since Hobbes's time. BishopBramhall, one of Hobbes's contemporaries, famouslyaccused Leviathan of being a 'Rebell'sCatechism.' More recently, some commentators have argued thatHobbes's discussion of the limits of political obligation is theAchilles' heel of his theory. It is not clear whether or not thischarge can stand up to scrutiny, but it will surely be the subject ofmuch continued discussion.

10. Religion and Social Instability

The last crucial aspect of Hobbes's political philosophy is histreatment of religion. Hobbes progressively expands his discussion ofChristian religion in each revision of his political philosophy, untilit comes in Leviathan to comprise roughly half the book. Thereis no settled consensus on how Hobbes understands the significance ofreligion within his political theory. Some commentators have arguedthat Hobbes is trying to demonstrate to his readers the compatibilityof his political theory with core Christian commitments, since it mayseem that Christians' religious duties forbid their affording the sortof absolute obedience to their governors which Hobbes's theory requiresof them. Others have doubted the sincerity of his professedChristianity, arguing that by the use of irony or other subtlerhetorical devices, Hobbes sought to undermine his readers' religiousbeliefs. Howsoever his intentions are properly understood, Hobbes'sobvious concern with the power of religious belief is a fact thatinterpreters of his political philosophy must seek to explain.

11. Hobbes on Women and the Family

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Scholars are increasingly interested in how Hobbes thought of thestatus of women, and of the family. Hobbes was one of the earliestwestern philosophers to count women as persons when devising a socialcontract among persons. He insists on the equality of all people,very explicitly including women. People are equal because they are allsubject to domination, and all potentially capable of dominatingothers. No person is so strong as to be invulnerable to attack whilesleeping by the concerted efforts of others, nor is any so strong asto be assured of dominating all others. Microsoft frontpage for mac free download.

In this relevant sense, women are naturally equal to men. They areequally naturally free, meaning that their consent is required beforethey will be under the authority of anyone else. In this, Hobbes'sclaims stand in stark contrast to many prevailing views of the time,according to which women were born inferior to and subordinate tomen. Sir Robert Filmer, who later served as the target of JohnLocke's First Treatise of Government, is a well-knownproponent of this view, which he calls patriarchalism. Explicitlyrejecting the patriarchalist view as well as Salic law, Hobbesmaintains that women can be sovereigns; authority for him is'neither male nor female'. He also argues for naturalmaternal right: in the state of nature, dominion over children isnaturally the mother's. He witnesses the Amazons.

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The 17^th Century English philosopher Thomas Hobbes is nowwidely regarded as one of a handful of truly great politicalphilosophers, whose masterwork Leviathan rivals insignificance the political writings of Plato, Aristotle, Locke,Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. Hobbes is famous for his early andelaborate development of what has come to be known as 'socialcontract theory', the method of justifying political principlesor arrangements by appeal to the agreement that would be made amongsuitably situated rational, free, and equal persons. He is infamousfor having used the social contract method to arrive at theastonishing conclusion that we ought to submit to the authority of anabsolute—undivided and unlimited—sovereign power. Whilehis methodological innovation had a profound constructive impact onsubsequent work in political philosophy, his substantive conclusionshave served mostly as a foil for the development of more palatablephilosophical positions. Hobbes's moral philosophy has been lessinfluential than his political philosophy, in part because that theoryis too ambiguous to have garnered any general consensus as to itscontent. Most scholars have taken Hobbes to have affirmed some sort ofpersonal relativism or subjectivism; but views that Hobbes espouseddivine command theory, virtue ethics, rule egoism, or a form ofprojectivism also find support in Hobbes's texts and amongscholars. Because Hobbes held that 'the true doctrine of theLawes of Nature is the true Morall philosophie', differences ininterpretation of Hobbes's moral philosophy can be traced to differingunderstandings of the status and operation of Hobbes's 'laws ofnature', which laws will be discussed below. The formerlydominant view that Hobbes espoused psychological egoism as thefoundation of his moral theory is currently widely rejected, and therehas been to date no fully systematic study of Hobbes's moralpsychology.

Time Stopper Download To download Time Stopper 4.02 click on the below Time stopper download link: 7. How to install Time Stopper? The Time Stopper installation took only a few minutes. The installation process is very easy and similar to other software. So try it yourself to install Time Stopper, if you have any problem then comment in below. Start the program. The first time that you use it the program it will present you with a license screen. The program is free and the license info is only displayed the first time (per PC). OnlyStopWatch does not have to be installed and can be executed easily from the desktop, and can be carried on a small usb-stick or other memory device. Article Summary X. To stop cracking your neck, start by gently stretching your neck muscles 3-5 times a day, since stretching can reduce some of the tension and discomfort that makes you want to crack your neck. Additionally, move your neck up and down, side to side, and in circles to loosen your joints. COX Stockman's are Engineered for life and built to last the test of time. Stockman's stand up to Australia's harsh conditions and are designed to handle tough jobs. Initial velocity multiplied by the time required to stop. In this case, this works out to be.5. 88. 4.4 = 193.6 feet, plus a reaction time of either 88 feet for a second delay in reaction time, or 176 feet for two seconds reaction time. That yields 281.6 feet or 369.6 when added to the base stopping distance of 193.6 feet.

• Bibliography

1. Major Political Writings

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Hobbes wrote several versions of his political philosophy, includingThe Elements of Law, Natural and Politic (also under thetitles Human Nature and De Corpore Politico)published in 1650, De Cive (1642) published in English asPhilosophical Rudiments Concerning Government and Society in1651, the English Leviathan published in 1651, and its Latinrevision in 1668. Others of his works are also important inunderstanding his political philosophy, especially his history of theEnglish Civil War, Behemoth (published 1679), DeCorpore (1655), De Homine (1658), Dialogue Between aPhilosopher and a Student of the Common Laws of England (1681),and The Questions Concerning Liberty, Necessity, and Chance(1656). All of Hobbes's major writings are collected in TheEnglish Works of Thomas Hobbes, edited by Sir William Molesworth(11 volumes, London 1839–45), and Thomae Hobbes Opera PhilosophicaQuae Latina Scripsit Omnia, also edited by Molesworth (5 volumes;London, 1839–45). Oxford University Press has undertaken a projected26 volume collection of the Clarendon Edition of the Works ofThomas Hobbes. So far 3 volumes are available: De Cive(edited by Howard Warrender), The Correspondence of ThomasHobbes (edited by Noel Malcolm), and Writings on Common Lawand Hereditary Right (edited by Alan Cromartie and QuentinSkinner). Recently Noel Malcolm has published a three volume editionof Leviathan, which places the English text side by side withHobbes's later Latin version of it. Readers new to Hobbes should beginwith Leviathan, being sure to read Parts Three and Four, as well asthe more familiar and often excerpted Parts One and Two. There are manyfine overviews of Hobbes's normative philosophy, some of which arelisted in the following selected bibliography of secondary works.

2. The Philosophical Project

Hobbes sought to discover rational principles for the construction ofa civil polity that would not be subject to destruction from within.Having lived through the period of political disintegrationculminating in the English Civil War, he came to the view that theburdens of even the most oppressive government are 'scarcesensible, in respect of the miseries, and horrible calamities, thataccompany a Civill Warre'. Because virtually any governmentwould be better than a civil war, and, according to Hobbes's analysis,all but absolute governments are systematically prone to dissolutioninto civil war, people ought to submit themselves to an absolutepolitical authority. Continued stability will require that they alsorefrain from the sorts of actions that might undermine such aregime. For example, subjects should not dispute the sovereign powerand under no circumstances should they rebel. In general, Hobbes aimedto demonstrate the reciprocal relationship between political obedienceand peace.

3. The State of Nature

To establish these conclusions, Hobbes invites us to consider whatlife would be like in a state of nature, that is, a condition withoutgovernment. Perhaps we would imagine that people might fare best insuch a state, where each decides for herself how to act, and is judge,jury and executioner in her own case whenever disputes arise—andthat at any rate, this state is the appropriate baseline against whichto judge the justifiability of political arrangements. Hobbes termsthis situation 'the condition of mere nature', a state ofperfectly private judgment, in which there is no agency withrecognized authority to arbitrate disputes and effective power toenforce its decisions.

Hobbes's near descendant, John Locke, insisted in his SecondTreatise of Government that the state of nature was indeed to bepreferred to subjection to the arbitrary power of an absolutesovereign. But Hobbes famously argued that such a 'dissolutecondition of masterlesse men, without subjection to Lawes, and acoercive Power to tye their hands from rapine, and revenge' wouldmake impossible all of the basic security upon which comfortable,sociable, civilized life depends. There would be 'no place forindustry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain; and consequently noculture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities thatmay be imported by Sea; no commodious Building; no Instruments ofmoving and removing such things as require much force; no Knowledge ofthe face of the Earth; no account of Time; no Arts; no Letters; andwhich is worst of all, continuall feare, and danger of violent death;And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short.'If this is the state of nature, people have strong reasons to avoid it,which can be done only by submitting to some mutually recognized publicauthority, for 'so long a man is in the condition of mere nature,(which is a condition of war,) as private appetite is the measure ofgood and evill.'

Although many readers have criticized Hobbes's state of nature asunduly pessimistic, he constructs it from a number of individuallyplausible empirical and normative assumptions. He assumes that peopleare sufficiently similar in their mental and physical attributes thatno one is invulnerable nor can expect to be able to dominate theothers. Hobbes assumes that people generally 'shun death',and that the desire to preserve their own lives is very strong in mostpeople. While people have local affections, their benevolence islimited, and they have a tendency to partiality. Concerned that othersshould agree with their own high opinions of themselves, people aresensitive to slights. They make evaluative judgments, but often useseemingly impersonal terms like ‘good' and‘bad' to stand for their own personal preferences. They arecurious about the causes of events, and anxious about their futures;according to Hobbes, these characteristics incline people to adoptreligious beliefs, although the content of those beliefs will differdepending upon the sort of religious education one has happened toreceive.

With respect to normative assumptions, Hobbes ascribes to eachperson in the state of nature a liberty right to preserve herself,which he terms 'the right of nature'. This is the right todo whatever one sincerely judges needful for one's preservation; yetbecause it is at least possible that virtually anything might be judgednecessary for one's preservation, this theoretically limited right ofnature becomes in practice an unlimited right to potentially anything,or, as Hobbes puts it, a right 'to all things'. Hobbesfurther assumes as a principle of practical rationality, that peopleshould adopt what they see to be the necessary means to their mostimportant ends.

4. The State of Nature Is a State of War

Taken together, these plausible descriptive and normativeassumptions yield a state of nature potentially fraught with divisivestruggle. The right of each to all things invites serious conflict,especially if there is competition for resources, as there will surelybe over at least scarce goods such as the most desirable lands,spouses, etc. People will quite naturally fear that others may (citingthe right of nature) invade them, and may rationally plan to strikefirst as an anticipatory defense. Moreover, that minority of pridefulor 'vain-glorious' persons who take pleasure in exercisingpower over others will naturally elicit preemptive defensive responsesfrom others. Conflict will be further fueled by disagreement inreligious views, in moral judgments, and over matters as mundane aswhat goods one actually needs, and what respect one properly merits.Hobbes imagines a state of nature in which each person is free todecide for herself what she needs, what she's owed, what's respectful,right, pious, prudent, and also free to decide all of these questionsfor the behavior of everyone else as well, and to act on her judgmentsas she thinks best, enforcing her views where she can. In this situationwhere there is no common authority to resolve these many and seriousdisputes, we can easily imagine with Hobbes that the state of naturewould become a 'state of war', even worse, a war of'all against all'.

5. Further Questions About the State of Nature

In response to the natural question whether humanity ever wasgenerally in any such state of nature, Hobbes gives three examples ofputative states of nature. First, he notes that all sovereigns are inthis state with respect to one another. This claim has made Hobbes therepresentative example of a 'realist' in internationalrelations. Second, he opined that many now civilized peoples wereformerly in that state, and some few peoples—'the savagepeople in many places of America' (Leviathan, XIII),for instance—were still to his day in the state of nature. Thirdand most significantly, Hobbes asserts that the state of nature willbe easily recognized by those whose formerly peaceful states havecollapsed into civil war. While the state of nature's condition ofperfectly private judgment is an abstraction, something resembling ittoo closely for comfort remains a perpetually present possibility, tobe feared, and avoided.

Do the other assumptions of Hobbes's philosophy license the existenceof this imagined state of isolated individuals pursuing their privatejudgments? Probably not, since, as feminist critics among others havenoted, children are by Hobbes's theory assumed to have undertaken anobligation of obedience to their parents in exchange for nurturing,and so the primitive units in the state of nature will includefamilies ordered by internal obligations, as well as individuals. Thebonds of affection, sexual affinity, and friendship—as well asof clan membership and shared religious belief—may furtherdecrease the accuracy of any purely individualistic model of the stateof nature. This concession need not impugn Hobbes's analysis ofconflict in the state of nature, since it may turn out thatcompetition, diffidence and glory-seeking are disastrous sources ofconflicts among small groups just as much as they are amongindividuals. Still, commentators seeking to answer the question howprecisely we should understand Hobbes's state of nature areinvestigating the degree to which Hobbes imagines that to be acondition of interaction among isolated individuals.

Another important open question is that of what, exactly, it is abouthuman beings that makes it the case (supposing Hobbes is right) thatour communal life is prone to disaster when we are left to interactaccording only to our own individual judgments. Perhaps, while peopledo wish to act for their own best long-term interest, they areshortsighted, and so indulge their current interests without properlyconsidering the effects of their current behavior on their long-terminterest. This would be a type of failure ofrationality. Alternatively, it may be that people in the state ofnature are fully rational, but are trapped in a situation that makesit individually rational for each to act in a way that is sub-optimalfor all, perhaps finding themselves in the familiar ‘prisoner'sdilemma' of game theory. Or again, it may be that Hobbes's stateof nature would be peaceful but for the presence of persons (just afew, or perhaps all, to some degree) whose passions overrule theircalmer judgments; who are prideful, spiteful, partial, envious,jealous, and in other ways prone to behave in ways that lead towar. Such an account would understand irrational human passions to bethe source of conflict. Which, if any, of these accounts adequatelyanswers to Hobbes's text is a matter of continuing debate among Hobbesscholars. Game theorists have been particularly active in thesedebates, experimenting with different models for the state of natureand the conflict it engenders.

6. The Laws of Nature

Hobbes argues that the state of nature is a miserable state of warin which none of our important human ends are reliably realizable.Happily, human nature also provides resources to escape this miserablecondition. Hobbes argues that each of us, as a rational being, can seethat a war of all against all is inimical to the satisfaction of herinterests, and so can agree that 'peace is good, and thereforealso the way or means of peace are good'. Humans will recognizeas imperatives the injunction to seek peace, and to do those thingsnecessary to secure it, when they can do so safely. Hobbes calls thesepractical imperatives 'Lawes of Nature', the sum of whichis not to treat others in ways we would not have them treat us. These'precepts', 'conclusions' or'theorems' of reason are 'eternal andimmutable', always commanding our assent even when they may notsafely be acted upon. They forbid many familiar vices such as iniquity,cruelty, and ingratitude. Although commentators do not agree on whetherthese laws should be regarded as mere precepts of prudence, or ratheras divine commands, or moral imperatives of some other sort, all agreethat Hobbes understands them to direct people to submit to politicalauthority. They tell us to seek peace with willing others by layingdown part of our 'right to all things', by mutuallycovenanting to submit to the authority of a sovereign, and furtherdirect us to keep that covenant establishing sovereignty.

7. Establishing Sovereign Authority

When people mutually covenant each to the others to obey a commonauthority, they have established what Hobbes calls 'sovereigntyby institution'. When, threatened by a conqueror, they covenantfor protection by promising obedience, they have established'sovereignty by acquisition'. These are equally legitimateways of establishing sovereignty, according to Hobbes, and theirunderlying motivation is the same—namely fear—whether ofone's fellows or of a conqueror. The social covenant involves both therenunciation or transfer of right and the authorization of thesovereign power. Political legitimacy depends not on how a governmentcame to power, but only on whether it can effectively protect thosewho have consented to obey it; political obligation ends whenprotection ceases.

8. Absolutism

Although Hobbes offered some mild pragmatic grounds for preferringmonarchy to other forms of government, his main concern was to arguethat effective government—whatever its form—must have absoluteauthority. Its powers must be neither divided nor limited. The powersof legislation, adjudication, enforcement, taxation, war-making (andthe less familiar right of control of normative doctrine) are connectedin such a way that a loss of one may thwart effective exercise of therest; for example, legislation without interpretation and enforcementwill not serve to regulate conduct. Only a government that possessesall of what Hobbes terms the 'essential rights ofsovereignty' can be reliably effective, since where partial setsof these rights are held by different bodies that disagree in theirjudgments as to what is to be done, paralysis of effective government,or degeneration into a civil war to settle their dispute, mayoccur.

Similarly, to impose limitation on the authority of the governmentis to invite irresoluble disputes over whether it has overstepped thoselimits. If each person is to decide for herself whether the governmentshould be obeyed, factional disagreement—and war to settle theissue, or at least paralysis of effective government—are quitepossible. To refer resolution of the question to some furtherauthority, itself also limited and so open to challenge foroverstepping its bounds, would be to initiate an infinite regress ofnon-authoritative ‘authorities' (where the buck neverstops). To refer it to a further authority itself unlimited, would bejust to relocate the seat of absolute sovereignty, a position entirelyconsistent with Hobbes's insistence on absolutism. To avoid thehorrible prospect of governmental collapse and return to the state ofnature, people should treat their sovereign as having absoluteauthority.

9. Responsibility and the Limits of Political Obligation

When subjects institute a sovereign by authorizing it, they agree, inconformity with the principle 'no wrong is done to a consentingparty', not to hold it liable for any errors in judgment it maymake and not to treat any harms it does to them as actionableinjustices. Although many interpreters have assumed that byauthorizing a sovereign, subjects become morally responsible for theactions it commands, Hobbes instead insists that 'the externalactions done in obedience to [laws], without the inward approbation,are the actions of the sovereign, and not of the subject, which is inthat case but as an instrument, without any motion of his own atall' (Leviathan xlii, 106). It may be important to Hobbes'sproject of persuading his Christian readers to obey their sovereignthat he can reassure them that God will not hold them responsible forwrongful actions done at the sovereign's command, because they cannotreasonably be expected to obey if doing so would jeopardize theireternal prospects. Hence Hobbes explains that 'whatsoever asubject..is compelled to do in obedience to his sovereign, and dothit not in order to his own mind, but in order to the laws of hiscountry, that action is not his, but his sovereign's.'(Leviathan xlii. 11) This position reinforces absolutism by permittingHobbes to maintain that subjects can obey even commands to performactions they believe to be sinful without fear of divinepunishment.

While Hobbes insists that we should regard our governments as havingabsolute authority, he reserves to subjects the liberty of disobeyingsome of their government's commands. He argues that subjects retain aright of self-defense against the sovereign power, giving them theright to disobey or resist when their lives are in danger. He alsogives them seemingly broad resistance rights in cases in which theirfamilies or even their honor are at stake. These exceptions haveunderstandably intrigued those who study Hobbes. His ascription ofapparently inalienable rights—what he calls the 'trueliberties of subjects'—seems incompatible with his defenseof absolute sovereignty. Moreover, if the sovereign's failure toprovide adequate protection to subjects extinguishes their obligationto obey, and if it is left to each subject to judge for herself theadequacy of that protection, it seems that people have never reallyexited the fearsome state of nature. This aspect of Hobbes's politicalphilosophy has been hotly debated ever since Hobbes's time. BishopBramhall, one of Hobbes's contemporaries, famouslyaccused Leviathan of being a 'Rebell'sCatechism.' More recently, some commentators have argued thatHobbes's discussion of the limits of political obligation is theAchilles' heel of his theory. It is not clear whether or not thischarge can stand up to scrutiny, but it will surely be the subject ofmuch continued discussion.

10. Religion and Social Instability

The last crucial aspect of Hobbes's political philosophy is histreatment of religion. Hobbes progressively expands his discussion ofChristian religion in each revision of his political philosophy, untilit comes in Leviathan to comprise roughly half the book. Thereis no settled consensus on how Hobbes understands the significance ofreligion within his political theory. Some commentators have arguedthat Hobbes is trying to demonstrate to his readers the compatibilityof his political theory with core Christian commitments, since it mayseem that Christians' religious duties forbid their affording the sortof absolute obedience to their governors which Hobbes's theory requiresof them. Others have doubted the sincerity of his professedChristianity, arguing that by the use of irony or other subtlerhetorical devices, Hobbes sought to undermine his readers' religiousbeliefs. Howsoever his intentions are properly understood, Hobbes'sobvious concern with the power of religious belief is a fact thatinterpreters of his political philosophy must seek to explain.

11. Hobbes on Women and the Family

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Scholars are increasingly interested in how Hobbes thought of thestatus of women, and of the family. Hobbes was one of the earliestwestern philosophers to count women as persons when devising a socialcontract among persons. He insists on the equality of all people,very explicitly including women. People are equal because they are allsubject to domination, and all potentially capable of dominatingothers. No person is so strong as to be invulnerable to attack whilesleeping by the concerted efforts of others, nor is any so strong asto be assured of dominating all others. Microsoft frontpage for mac free download.

In this relevant sense, women are naturally equal to men. They areequally naturally free, meaning that their consent is required beforethey will be under the authority of anyone else. In this, Hobbes'sclaims stand in stark contrast to many prevailing views of the time,according to which women were born inferior to and subordinate tomen. Sir Robert Filmer, who later served as the target of JohnLocke's First Treatise of Government, is a well-knownproponent of this view, which he calls patriarchalism. Explicitlyrejecting the patriarchalist view as well as Salic law, Hobbesmaintains that women can be sovereigns; authority for him is'neither male nor female'. He also argues for naturalmaternal right: in the state of nature, dominion over children isnaturally the mother's. He witnesses the Amazons.

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In seeming contrast to this egalitarian foundation, Hobbes spoke ofthe commonwealth in patriarchal language. In the move from the stateof nature to civil society, families are described as'fathers', 'servants', and'children', seemingly obliterating mothers from thepicture entirely. Hobbes justifies this way of talking by saying thatit is fathers not mothers who have founded societies. As true as thatis, it is easy to see how there is a lively debate between those whoemphasize the potentially feminist or egalitarian aspects of Hobbes'sthought and those who emphasize his ultimate exclusion of women. Suchdebates raise the question: To what extent are the patriarchal claimsHobbes makes integral to his overall theory, if indeed they areintegral at all?

Bibliography

The secondary literature on Hobbes's moral and political philosophy(not to speak of his entire body of work) is vast, appearing acrossmany disciplines and in many languages. The following is a narrowselection of fairly recent works by philosophers, political theorists,and intellectual historians, available in English, on main areas ofinquiry in Hobbes's moral and political thought. Very helpful forfurther reference is the critical bibliography of Hobbes scholarship to1990 contained in Zagorin, P., 1990, 'Hobbes on Our Mind',Journal of the History of Ideas, 51(2).

Journals

• Hobbes Studies is an annually published journal devoted toscholarly research on all aspects of Hobbes's work.

Collections

• Brown, K.C. (ed.), 1965, Hobbes Studies, Cambridge:Harvard University Press, contains important papers by A.E. Taylor,J.W. N. Watkins, Howard Warrender, and John Plamenatz, amongothers.
• Caws, P. (ed.), 1989, The Causes of Quarrell: Essays onPeace, War, and Thomas Hobbes, Boston: Beacon Press.
• Courtland, S. (ed.), 2017, Hobbesian Applied Ethics and PublicPolicy, New York: Routledge.
• Dietz, M. (ed.), 1990, Thomas Hobbes and PoliticalTheory, Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.
• Dyzenhaus, D. and T. Poole (eds.), 2013, Hobbes and theLaw, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Finkelstein, C. (ed.), 2005, Hobbes on Law, Aldershot:Ashgate.
• Hirschmann, N. and J. Wright (eds.), 2012, FeministInterpretations of Thomas Hobbes, University Park: PennsylvaniaState University Press.
• Lloyd, S.A., 2012, Hobbes Today: Insights for the 21stCentury, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2013, The Bloomsbury Companion toHobbes, London: Bloomsbury.
• –––, forthcoming, Interpretations of Hobbes'Political Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Lloyd, S.A. (ed.), 2001, 'Special Issue on Recent Work on theMoral and Political Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes', PacificPhilosophical Quarterly, 82 (3&4).
• Martinich, A.P. and Kinch Hoekstra (eds.), 2016, The OxfordHandbook of Hobbes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rogers, G.A.J. and A. Ryan (eds.), 1988, Perspectives onThomas Hobbes, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Rogers, G.A.J. (ed.), 1995, Leviathan: Contemporary Responsesto the Political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, Bristol: ThoemmesPress.
• Rogers, G.A.J. and T. Sorell (eds.), 2000, Hobbes andHistory. London: Routledge.
• Shaver, R. (ed.), 1999, Hobbes, Hanover: DartmouthPress.
• Sorell, T. (ed.), 1996, The Cambridge Companion to HobbesCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Sorell, T., and L. Foisneau (eds.), 2004, Leviathan after 350years, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sorell, T. and G.A.J. Rogers (eds.), 2000, Hobbes andHistory, London: Routledge.
• Springboard, P. (ed.), 2007, The Cambridge Companion toHobbes's Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Books and Articles

• Abizadeh, A., 2011, 'Hobbes on the Causes of War: A DisagreementTheory', American Political Science Review, 105 (2):298–315.
• Armitage, D., 2007, 'Hobbes and the foundations of moderninternational thought', in Rethinking the Foundations of ModernPolitical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Ashcraft, R., 1971, 'Hobbes's Natural Man: A Study in IdeologyFormation', Journal of Politics, 33: 1076–1117.
• –––, 2010, 'Slavery Discourse before theRestoration: The Barbary Coast, Justinian's Digest, and Hobbes'sPolitical Theory', History of European Ideas, 36 (2):412–418.
• Baumgold, D., 1988, Hobbes's Political Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Baumgold, D., 2013, 'Trust in Hobbes's PoliticalThought', Political Theory, 41(6): 835–55.
• Bobbio, N., 1993, Thomas Hobbes and the Natural LawTradition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Boonin-Vail, D., 1994, Thomas Hobbes and the Science of MoralVirtue, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Byron, M., 2015, Submission and Subjection in Leviathan: GoodSubjects in the Hobbbesian Commonwealth, Basingstoke, NewYork: Palgrave MacMillan.
• Collins, J., 2005, The Allegiance of Thomas Hobbes,Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Curley, E., 1988, 'I durst not write so boldly: or how to readHobbes' theological-political treatise', E. Giancotti (ed.),Proceedings of the Conference on Hobbes and Spinoza,Urbino.
• –––, 1994, 'Introduction to Hobbes'sLeviathan', Leviathan with selected variants fromthe Latin edition of 1668, E. Curley (ed.), Indianapolis: IndianaUniversity Press.
• Curran, E., 2006, 'Can Rights Curb the Hobbesian Sovereign?The Full Right to Self-preservation, Duties of Sovereignty and theLimitations of Hohfeld', Law and Philosophy, 25:243–265.
• –––, 2007, Reclaiming the Rights ofHobbesian Subjects, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
• –––, 2013, 'An Immodest Proposal: HobbesRather than Locke Provides a Forerunner for Modern RightsTheory', Law and Philosophy, 32 (4): 515–538.
• Darwall, S., 1995. The British Moralists and the Internal‘Ought', 1640–1740, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress
• ––– 2000, 'Normativity and Projection inHobbes's Leviathan', The Philosophical Review, 109(3): 313–347.
• Ewin, R.E., 1991, Virtues and Rights: The Moral Philosophy ofThomas Hobbes, Boulder: Westview Press.
• Finn, S., 2006, Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of NaturalPhilosophy, London: Continuum Press.
• Flathman, R., 1993, Thomas Hobbes: Skepticism, Individuality,and Chastened Politics, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
• Gauthier, D., 1969, The Logic of ‘Leviathan': theMoral and political Theory of Thomas Hobbes, Oxford: ClarendonPress.
• Gert, B., 1967, 'Hobbes and psychological egoism', Journal ofthe History of Ideas, 28: 503–520.
• ––– 1978, 'Introduction to Man and Citizen',Man and Citizen, B. Gert, (ed.), New York: HumanitiesPress.
• ––– 1988, 'The law of nature and the moral law',Hobbes Studies, 1: 26–44.
• Goldsmith, M. M., 1966, Hobbes's Science of Politics, NewYork: Columbia University Press
• Green, M., 2015, 'Authorization and Political Authority inHobbes', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 62(3):25–47.
• Hampton, J., 1986, Hobbes and the Social ContractTradition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Herbert, G., 1989, Thomas Hobbes: The Unity of Scientific andMoral Wisdom, Vancouver: University of British ColumbiaPress.
• Hoekstra, K., 1999, 'Nothing to Declare: Hobbes and theAdvocate of Injustice', Political Theory, 27 (2):230–235.
• –––, 2003, 'Hobbes on Law, Nature andReason', Journal of the History of Philosophy, 41 (1):111–120.
• –––, 2006, 'The End ofPhilosophy', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 106:25–62.
• –––, 2007, 'A lion in the house: Hobbesand democracy' in Rethinking the Foundations of ModernPolitical Thought, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2013, 'Early Modern Absolutism andConstitutionalism', Cardozo Law Review, 34 (3):1079–1098.
• Hood, E.C., 1964. The Divine Politics of Thomas Hobbes,Oxford: Clarendon Press.
• Johnston, D., 1986, The Rhetoric of ‘Leviathan':Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Cultural Transformation,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Kapust, Daniel J. and Brandon P. Turner, 2013, 'DemocraticalGentlemen and the Lust for Mastery: Status, Ambition, and the Languageof Liberty in Hobbes's Political Thought', PoliticalTheory, 41 (4): 648–675.
• Kavka, G., 1986, Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory,Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Kramer, M., 1997, Hobbes and the Paradox of PoliticalOrigins, New York: St. Martin's Press.
• Krom, M., 2011, The Limits of Reason in Hobbes'sCommonwealth, New York: Continuum Press.
• LeBuffe, M., 2003, 'Hobbes on the Origin ofObligation', British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 11 (1): 15–39.
• Lloyd, S.A., 1992, Ideals as Interests in Hobbes's‘Leviathan': the Power of Mind over Matter,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1998, 'Contemporary Uses of Hobbes'spolitical philosophy', in Rational Commitment and SocialJustice: Essays for Gregory Kavka, J. Coleman and C. Morris(eds.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2009, Morality in the Philosophy ofThomas Hobbes: Cases in the Law of Nature, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• –––, 2016, 'Authorization and MoralResponsibility in the Philosophy of Hobbes', HobbesStudies, 29: 169–88.
• –––, 2017, 'Duty WithoutObligation', Hobbes Studies, 30: 202–221.
• Macpherson, C.B., 1962, The Political Theory of PossessiveIndividualism: Hobbes to Locke, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress.
• –––, 1968, 'Introduction',Leviathan, C.B. Macpherson (ed.), London: Penguin.
• Malcolm, N., 2002, Aspects of Hobbes, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• Martel, J., 2007, Subverting the Leviathan: Reading ThomasHobbes as a Radical Democrat, New York: Columbia UniversityPress.
• Martinich, A.P., 1992, The Two Gods of Leviathan: ThomasHobbes on Religion and Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• –––, 1995, A Hobbes Dictionary, Oxford:Blackwell.
• –––, 1999, Hobbes: A Biography,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2005, Hobbes, New York:Routledge.
• –––, 2011, 'The Sovereign in the PoliticalThought of Hanfeizi and Thomas Hobbes', Journal of ChinesePhilosophy, 38 (1): 64–72.
• May, L., 2013, Limiting Leviathan: Hobbes on Law andInternational Affairs, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• McClure, C.S., 2013, 'War, Madness, and Death: The Paradoxof Honor in Hobbes's Leviathan', The Journal ofPolitics, 76 (1): 114–125.
• Moehler, M., 2009, 'Why Hobbes' State of Nature is BestModeled by an Assurance Game', Utilitas, 21 (3):297–326.
• Moloney, P., 2011, 'Hobbes, Savagery, and InternationalAnarchy', American Political Science Review, 105 (1):189–204.
• Murphy, M., 2000, 'Hobbes on the Evil of Death',Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 82: 36–61.
• Nagel, T., 1959, 'Hobbes's Concept of Obligation',Philosophical Review, 68: 68–83.
• Oakeshott, M., 1975. Hobbes on Civil Association, Oxford:Oxford University Press.
• Olsthoorn, J., 2013, 'Why Justice and Injustice Have NoPlace Outside the Hobbesian State', European Journal ofPolitical Theory.
• –––, 2013, 'Hobbes Account of DistributiveJustice as Equity', British Journal for the History ofPhilosophy, 21 (1): 13–33.
• Peacock, M., 2010, 'Obligation and Advantage in Hobbes'Leviathan', Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 40 (3):433–458.
• Petit, P., 2008, Made With Words: Hobbes on Language, Mind,and Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press.
• Raphael, D. D., 1977, Hobbes: Morals and Politics,London: Routledge Press.
• Ryan, A., 1986, 'A More Tolerant Hobbes?', S. Mendus, (ed.),Justifying Toleration, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• Shelton, G., 1992, Morality and Sovereignty in the Philosophyof Thomas Hobbes, New York: St. Martin's Press.
• Schneewind, J.B., 1997, The Invention of Autonomy: History ofModern Moral Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• Schwitzgebel, E., 2007, 'Human Nature and Moral Education inMencius, Xunzi, Hobbes, and Rousseau', History of PhilosophyQuarterly, 24 (2): 147–168.
• Skinner, Q., 1996, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy ofHobbes, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2002, Visions of Politics Volume 3:Hobbes and Civil Science, Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress.
• –––, 2005, 'Hobbes onRepresentation', European Journal of Philosophy, 13(2): 155–184.
• –––, 2008, Hobbes and RepublicanLiberty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Slomp, G., 2000. Thomas Hobbes and the Politics of Glory,New York: St. Martin's Press.
• Sommerville, J., 1992, Thomas Hobbes: Political Ideas inHistorical Context, London: Macmillan.
• Sorell, T., 1986, Hobbes, London: Routledge and KeganPaul.
• –––, 2006, 'Hobbes on Trade, Consumption,and International Order', Monist, 89 (2): 245–258.
• Springborg, P., 2011, 'Hobbes's Fool the Insipiens, and theTyrant-King', Political Theory 39 (1): 85–111.
• Sreedhar, S., 2008, 'Defending the Hobbesian Right ofSelf-Defense', Political Theory, 36 (6): 781–802.
• –––, 2010, Hobbes on Resistance: Defyingthe Leviathan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 2012, 'Hobbes on ‘The WomanQuestion'', Philosophy Compass, 7 (11): 772–781.
• Strauss, L., 1936, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: itsBasis and Genesis, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Sussmann, N., 2010, 'How Many Commonwealths can LeviathanSwallow? Covenant, Sovereign, and People in Hobbes's PoliticalTheory', British Journal for the History of Philosophy,18 (4): 575–596.
• Tralau, J., 2011, 'Hobbes Contra Liberty ofConscience', Political Theory, 39 (1): 58–84.
• Tuck, R., 1979, Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin andDevelopment, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1989, Hobbes, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.
• –––, 1991, 'Introduction', Leviathan,R. Tuck, (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• –––, 1993, Philosophy and Government1572–1651, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Van Mill, D., 2001, Liberty, Rationality, and Agency inHobbes's Leviathan, Albany: State University of New YorkPress.
• Venezia, L., 2013, 'Hobbes' Two Accounts of Law and theStructure of Reasons for Political Obedience', EuropeanJournal of Political Theory.
• Warrender, H., 1957, The Political Philosophy of Hobbes: hisTheory of Obligation, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• Watkins, J.W.N., 1965, Hobbes's System of Ideas, London:Hutchison and Co.
• Zagorin, P., 2009, Hobbes and the Law of Nature,Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Academic Tools

Other Internet Resources

• Entry on Thomas Hobbes, by Garrath Williams, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
• A blog discussing Hobbes's relevance to contemporary issues.
• European Hobbes Society.

Related Entries

contractarianism | egoism | ethics: natural law tradition | game theory | Hobbes, Thomas | legal rights | liberalism | Locke, John: political philosophy | nature of law: natural law theories | prisoner's dilemma | rights

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Susanne Sreedhar<sreedhar@bu.edu>